Archive for the 'Immunity Program' Category
November 16, 2012
The following are some of the more interesting competition, advertising and regulatory law developments that caught my eye over the past several days, at least to the extent they have a bearing on Canada or companies doing business in Canada:
BCE and Astral plan to work towards reworking their deal to obtain regulatory clearance (see: here and here), following a rejection of the deal by the federal CRTC.
The Malaysian state-owned oil company Petronas was reported to be revising undertakings to obtain Investment Canada Act clearance for its acquisition of Progress Energy (see: here).
The CRTC launched new web pages for their planned mandatory wireless code consultations that include the “top 100 liked” comments for a new wireless code (see: here).
Earlier today, Canada’s Finance Minister gave some further indications that the Federal Government may soon reveal new Investment Canada Act rules for FDI in Canada and that the new rules may include “limits” (see: here). Any such rules would replace and/or supplement existing Investment Canada Act provisions and guidelines under the ICA (e.g., those specifically relating to national security or state-owned-enterprises).
More testimony unfolded in the ongoing Quebec corruption and competition law probe relating to allegations of municipal bribes and bid-rigging in the construction sector in Quebec (Monique Muise at the Gazette in Montreal has the best feed going on this, plus she has a sense of humour and, if I may say, classic Quebecois ability to take things in stride – see: here).
November 14, 2012
When companies think about competition law compliance, the focus is often on senior management and board compliance – that is, ensuring that the board, and a firm’s directors and officers, have a clear understanding of competition law rules. That is not to say that it is not well known that managers, and in particular a company’s sales force, are often at the center of competition/antitrust issues. Practically, however, companies often approach compliance from the top down with an expectation that senior management will disseminate the compliance message down through an organization. Sometimes that is the case. In more cases, however, it seems that it is not – as is evidenced by the Competition Bureau’s perennial complaint that many companies have compliance programs, but fail to effectively implement them.
In this regard, a recent U.K. paper caught my eye on the role of marketing managers in global cartels entitled “The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers Within International Cartels” (J.K. Ashton & A.D. Pressey).
This study looked at 56 major international cartels investigated by the European Union with findings that include the fact that marketing and sales managers have been involved in a substantial percentage of cartels (42.9%), are seldom the most senior managers, tended to involve global cartels (in manufacturing more than distribution industries) and involved information exchanges in the context of predominantly market allocation and price-fixing arrangements.
Interestingly, this study also looks at some of the strategies cartels have used to avoid detection (including minimizing meetings, punishing “cheating” and more levels of organizational hierarchy – i.e., buffers between marketing personnel and senior management), marketing managers’ involvement in trade associations and statistics of U.S. incarceration of foreign nationals and the reliance of whistle blowers in investigations.
Abstract:
“Although the study of international cartels has a considerable lineage our understanding of their organization, operation and management remains limited. This study attends to this omission through examining the role of marketing and sales managers within international cartels using a content analysis of 56 major international price-fixing cartels over two decades (1990-2009). It is reported that marketing and sales managers are demonstrably involved in many international cartels (42.9% of all cartel cases), albeit often accompanied by more senior managers from other firm functions. Marketing and sales managers appear most frequently within worldwide and manufacturing industry cartels and where market allocation and customer-sharing practices occur. In light of these findings it is important to reassess both managerial attitudes towards inter-firm collaborations and enhance the position of antitrust concerns within business school syllabi.”
For a copy of the paper see: Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers within International Cartels.
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November 13, 2012
Given the ongoing testimony at the Charbonneau Commission in Montreal, which has included allegations of bid-rigging among Quebec construction firms, I thought I would post a short overview of bid-rigging under the Competition Act – a sort of “bid-rigging 101” list of FAQs. While much of this will likely be intuitive to most, Canadian bid-rigging law has a number of interesting aspects (and, like criminal cartels, can be very difficult for tendering authorities to detect).
What is bid rigging?
Unlike some jurisdictions, notably the U.S., Canada has a standalone bid-rigging offence, or to be more accurate related offences. Under section 47 of the federal Competition Act it is a criminal offence to:
1. Agree to not submit a bid or tender;
2. Agree to withdraw a bid or tender already made (an offence recently added to the Competition Act as a result of amendments in 2009); or
3. Submit a bid or tender arrived at by agreement.
In essence, the Competition Act prohibits most types of agreements or arrangements between competing bidders or tenderers (though there is one key exception).
Is it necessary to prove
anti-competitive effects on a market?
No. In Canada bid-rigging is referred to as a ”per se” offence, in that no anti-competitive effects need to be proven to make out an offence – in other words, the offence lies in the agreement to not submit a bid, withdraw a bid already made or submit bids arrived at by agreement.
Like the other criminal offences in the Competition Act, however, and criminal offences generally in Canada, it is necessary to prove all elements under section 47 on the criminal burden of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt).
What are some common types of bid-rigging
(i.e., ways parties attempt to avoid detection)?
Like criminal cartel (i.e., conspiracy) agreements, bid-rigging agreements are often structured in a handful of key ways to avoid detection. These include:
1. “Cover”, “courtesy” or “complementary” bidding: Some firms submit bids that are too high to be accepted (or with terms that are unacceptable to the tendering authority) to protect an agreed upon low bidder.
2. Bid suppression: One or more bidders that would otherwise bid or tender agree to refrain from bidding (or withdraw a previously made bid).
3. Bid rotation: All parties submit bids but take turns being the low bidder according to a systematic or rotating basis.
4. Market division: Suppliers agree not to compete in designated geographic areas or for specified customers.
5. Subcontracting: Parties that agree not to submit a bid (or submit a losing bid) are awarded subcontracts or supply agreements from the successful low bidder.
The above types of bid-rigging arrangements are typically intended to achieve several goals, including keeping the bid-rigging arrangement secret and dividing contracts/markets among the parties.
What must be proven to establish
an illegal bid-rigging agreement?
To establish an illegal bid-rigging agreement under section 47 of the Competition Act, all of the following elements must be established:
1. An agreement or arrangement between two or more persons (or bidders or tenderers as the case may be).
Like section 45 of the Competition Act (criminal conspiracy agreements), an agreement is an essential element to establish a bid-rigging offence under section 47. Also like the criminal conspiracy provisions, Canadian courts have held this element to require a “consensus of minds” or “mutual understanding” between the parties.
Mere consultations between parties bidding in relation to pricing, where there has been no agreement or arrangement between the parties and their respective bids are not communicated to the other before tenders are submitted, has been held not to contravene section 47.
In an interesting Canadian Bar Association (Competition Law Section) teleseminar earlier today (November 6th), the Competition Bureau’s Acting Senior Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Criminal Matters Branch, discussed the enforcement of cartels in small jurisdictions from a Canadian perspective.
The teleseminar, which included enforcement agency panelists from Canada (Matthew Boswell, Competition Bureau), Ireland (Patrick Kenny, Irish Competition Authority), New Zealand (Mary-Ann Borrowdale, New Zealand Commerce Commission) and Israel (Gadi Perl, Israel Antitrust Authority), focused on three aspects of “Cartel Enforcement in Smaller Jurisdictions”: the preparation of effective cartel laws; practical cartel enforcement issues; and enforcement results. In sum, the spectrum from the preparation of cartel rules to carrying them out.
The Senior Deputy Commissioner’s remarks focused on the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs and recent enforcement results. Interestingly, the Deputy Commissioner also discussed Bureau efforts to detect domestic (i.e., Canadian) cartels, a renewed focus on associations and the Bureau’s participation in the ongoing Quebec corruption/competition probe, which resulted in the resignation of Montreal’s Mayor last night and involved searches of four Laval engineering-consulting firms this morning.
Continued Reliance on Immunity and Leniency Programs
With respect to the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, the Senior Deputy Commissioner summarized some of their key elements, confirmed that they continue to be the Bureau’s most important cartel detection tools (calling them “extremely important to the successful detection” of cartels in Canada), reminding applicants that the threshold to obtain markers was extremely low (to encourage participants to come forward at their “earliest opportunity”), while emphasizing that the Bureau continues to expect strict compliance with the timelines in both programs.
With respect to the latter point, the Senior Deputy Commissioner made it clear that while the Bureau is willing to grant extensions to perfect markers beyond its 30-day guideline, extensions are not granted lightly and the Bureau looks for applicants to justify delays – for example, with reference to internal company investigations, a concrete work-plan to provide information and status updates on the progress of cooperation with other jurisdictions.
The Senior Deputy Commissioner also confirmed the Bureau’s continued expectation for Immunity and Leniency applicants to provide waivers for the Bureau to communicate and cooperate with foreign agencies (although backstopped his waiver comments by noting that the Bureau rarely exchanged documents and understood immunity/leniency applicants’ interest in maintaining a paperless process generally, including through the proffer process).
He also discussed the importance of predictability and transparency for the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs to operate effectively, noting the fact that the requirements for both Programs are set out in detail on the Bureau’s website (and in its Immunity and Leniency Bulletins), including key requirements, director and officer rights and guidelines for fine calculations.
Interestingly, however, the Senior Deputy Commissioner did not raise the recent Federal Court decision in the Maxzone case, which has created uncertainty of whether the Federal Court will accept mathematically derived joint sentencing submissions (see e.g.: here) particularly around the Bureau’s 20% of affected Canadian volume of commerce figure historically used as a starting point for fine negotiations.
Enforcement Priorities & Recent Developments
With respect to enforcement, which was in some ways the more interesting aspect of the Deputy Commissioner’s remarks earlier today, he discussed the Bureau’s practical need to divide its enforcement resources between international and domestic cartel cases, saying at one point that the Bureau could, if it wished, “completely fill its [cartel enforcement] dance card with international cases”. He did, however, emphasize the Bureau’s continued interest in detecting and commencing enforcement in relation to domestic (i.e., Canadian) cartels.
In this regard, the Deputy Commissioner indicated that while the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs had been very successful in attracting cross-border cartel immunity/leniency applicants, they had been less so for domestic cartels (saying that they had had “moderate success” in Canada to date).
As such, in order to find new ways to detect Canadian cartels, he discussed a four-pronged enforcement approach currently being utilized by the Bureau involving: (i) developing relationships with Canadian public procurement authorities, (ii) partnerships with Canadian law enforcement agencies, (iii) outreach efforts to Canadian companies and other organizations (e.g., trade and professional associations), and (iv) media and public awareness efforts (e.g., Bureau news releases, education, speeches, etc.).
In an interesting speech on September 14, 2012 by the Acting Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. DoJ’s Antitrust Division, Joseph Wayland discussed the continuing cooperation between U.S. and international enforcement agencies (including Canada), including in relation to the auto parts, air cargo, LCD and e-book cartel investigations and Google/Motorola and UT/Goodrich mergers.
In his speech, he emphasized three key drivers for international cooperation between agencies: increased understanding of the competitive process, increased efficiency for global enforcement and facilitating pro-consumer economic activity. The speech also discusses the increase of leniency programs globally and some of the strategic rationales for inter-agency cooperation.
For a copy of the speech see: International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division.
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On July 19, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced that Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd. pleaded guilty in the ongoing air cargo cartel case and was fined $5.5 million for its involvement from 2002 to 2006.
The Bureau’s investigation has led to seven convictions to date and fines of approximately $22 million (other airlines that have pleaded guilty in this case to fixing air cargo surcharges for shipments on some routes from Canada include Air France, Martinair, KLM, British Airways and Qantas).
For the Bureau’s earlier announcements in this case see: Air Carriers Plead Guilty to Price-Fixing Conspiracy (the initial round of fines was as follows: Air France – $4 million; KLM – $5 million; and Martinair – $1 million), Fourth Guilty Plea in Air Cargo Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Qantas was fined $155,000) and Cargolux Pleads Guilty in Air Cargo Price-fixing Conspiracy (Cargolux was fined $2.5 million).
The Bureau generally bases fine negotiations on the affected volume of commerce in Canada (see e.g.: Leniency Program – FAQs). In this respect, the Bureau will often begin with a “proxy” for a cartel party’s volume of commerce in Canada of 20% (i.e., based on the party’s volume of Canadian sales during the cartel period).
Under the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs a party that fulfills all requirements of the Bureau’s Immunity Program is entitled to full immunity from prosecution, while subsequent applicants may be entitled to 50% (for the “second in”), 35% (for the “third in”) and subsequent lesser reductions in penalties under its Leniency Program (although a critical distinction between the two programs is the latter requires applicants to plead guilty). Speed is, therefore, of the essence in evaluating whether to apply for immunity or leniency, as both of the Bureau’s programs involve a “race”.
For more about Canada’s conspiracy rules see:
For more about the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs see:
Immunity and Leniency Programs
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The Toronto Sun has reported that the federal Competition Bureau has commenced an investigation into alleged price-fixing activities among concrete companies in the Greater Toronto Area home-building industry.
According to the Bureau, it is investigating businesses in the residential concrete forming industry in the Greater Toronto Area (companies that create basement foundations for residential homes). In addition to contractors, the allegations appear to include a trade association, the Residential Low Rise Forming Contractors Association of Metropolitan Toronto and Vicinity (the LRFA). Also according to Bureau officials, criminal searches have been conducted in the Toronto area.
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be proven): (i) price-fixing agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product or service), (ii) market allocation/division agreements (agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product) and (iii) output/supply restriction agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product). Other types of agreements between competitors are potentially subject to review under a second and separate non-criminal reviewable matters agreement provision (section 90.1).
The construction industry has long been a target of competition/antitrust regulators. For example, some of the construction related cases in Canada, many of which have also involved trade associations and have gone back about a century, have included building contractors, corrugated metal pipe manufacturers, electrical contractors, gypsum dealers and manufacturers, plumbing contractors, road surfacing contractors, chain link fence contractors, among others.
On May 4, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Maxzone Auto Parts (Canada) Corp. has pleaded guilty for participating in an international price-fixing cartel relating to the sale of aftermarket replacement automobile lights and was fined Cdn. $1.5 million.
In making the announcement the Bureau said:
“Following a Bureau investigation, Maxzone Canada admitted to implementing an agreement with competitors to set the price of aftermarket automotive replacement lights in Canada from January 2004 to September 2008. The products, mainly headlights and tail lights, were primarily purchased by auto parts supply companies in Canada for use as replacement parts.
Today’s charges are the first to arise from this investigation and anyone with information relating to this cartel investigation is encouraged to contact the Bureau.”
This case is part of an ongoing global auto parts cartel investigation. According to the Bureau, it is relying on its Immunity and Leniency Programs as part of its investigation.
Under the Bureau’s Immunity Program, companies or individuals implicated in criminal conduct under the Competition Act may offer to cooperate with the Bureau in its investigation and request immunity (i.e., full immunity from prosecution for criminal offences under the Act).
Under the Bureau’s Leniency Program, parties that have contravened criminal provisions of the Act that are not entitled to full immunity – for example, are not “first in” as immunity is a race – may nevertheless be eligible for leniency in sentencing.
Templates/precedents and checklists to run promotional contests in Canada
Templates/precedents and checklists to comply with Canadian anti-spam law (CASL)
