Archive for the 'Immunity Program' Category
On April 13, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Suncor Energy Products Inc. (Sunoco) pleaded guilty to fixing gasoline prices from May to November, 2007 in Belleville, Ontario and that the Ontario Superior Court sentenced it to pay a $500,000 fine (see: Suncor (Sunoco) Energy Pleads Guilty to Price-Fixing in Belleville, Ontario).
In making the announcement, the Commissioner of Competition said:
“We are committed to pursuing those who engage in anti-competitive behaviour that harms Canadian businesses and consumers … Illegal agreements between competitors to fix prices deny consumers the benefits of competitive prices and choice.”
Last month, Pioneer Energy LP, Canadian Tire Corporation and Mr. Gas also pleaded guilty to price-fixing during the same period (in Kingston and Brockville) and were fined $2 million (see: Competition Bureau Announces $2 Million in Ontario Gas Price-fixing Case).
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be proven): (i) price-fixing agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product or service), (ii) market allocation/division agreements (agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product), (iii) output/supply restriction agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product).
Other types of agreements between competitors are potentially subject to review under a second and separate non-criminal reviewable matters agreement provision (section 90.1).
According to the Bureau, it became aware of the price-fixing activities in this case using its Immunity and Leniency Programs (see: Backgrounder – Gasoline Companies Plead Guilty to Price-Fixing in Kingston and Brockville, Ontario). Under the Competition Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, applicants may receive full immunity from prosecution or reductions in penalties for cooperating with a Bureau investigation.
Under the Bureau’s Immunity Program, a party or company implicated in criminal conduct under the Act may offer to cooperate with the Bureau in its investigation and request immunity (i.e., full immunity from prosecution for criminal offences under the Act). Under the Bureau’s Leniency Program, parties that have contravened criminal provisions of the Act that are not entitled to full immunity (e.g., are not “first in”) may nevertheless be eligible for leniency in sentencing. Importantly, the Bureau’s Immunity Program is a “race” in that only the first eligible applicant is entitled to full immunity. As such, evaluating whether the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs are available is an important and time-sensitive step for parties to potentially reduce liability.
According to the Bureau, it also used wiretaps and search warrants in its investigation in this case, searching five corporate locations, nine residences and two residential offices, seizing thousands of paper and electronic records and interviewing witnesses (for more about the Bureau’s enforcement powers see: Bureau Enforcement).
In a curious story that caught my eye today, CTV reported that the City of Ottawa is threatening to terminate its contracts with companies found to have conspired to fix the price of gas in Ottawa and ban all future City purchases from them.
According to CTV, City of Ottawa Councilors Stephen Blais and Steve Desroches sent a letter to Canadian Tire, Mr. Gas and Pioneer in Ottawa, all of which pleaded guilty in Ontario Superior Court last week to fixing the price of gas in 2007 and were fined $2 million (see: Competition Bureau Announces $2 Million Fines in Ontario Gas Price-fixing Case).
This case is the second major gasoline price-fixing investigation that the Bureau has disclosed in the past several years (the Bureau is currently concluding the largest criminal investigation in its history in relation to gasoline price-fixing in Quebec – see: Further Individual Pleads Guilty in Quebec Gasoline Price-fixing Cartel).
On March 20, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced that Canadian Tire Corporation, Pioneer Energy LP and Mr. Gas pleaded guilty in Ontario Superior Court in Brockville, Ontario to fixing the price of gasoline in 2007 at the pump and were fined $2 million.
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“’Consumers in Kingston and Brockville were denied a competitive price for gasoline as a result of this criminal price-fixing cartel,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘The Bureau will not hesitate to take action when it uncovers evidence of illegal price-fixing.’
The pleas are as follows: Pioneer Energy LP pleaded guilty to price-fixing in Kingston and Brockville, and was fined $985,000; Canadian Tire Corporation pleaded guilty to price-fixing in Kingston and Brockville, and was fined $900,000; and Mr. Gas pleaded guilty to price-fixing in Brockville and was fined $150,000.
Today’s criminal charges and guilty pleas are the result of an extensive Bureau investigation that found evidence that gas retailers or their representatives in these local markets phoned each other and agreed on the price they would charge customers for gasoline. The Bureau’s investigation into potential price-fixing in the retail gasoline market continues in the Southeastern Ontario market.”
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be shown):
1. Price-fixing agreements. Agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product.
2. Market allocation/division agreements. Agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product.
3. Output/supply restriction agreements. Agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product (which may include group boycotts).
UBS disclosed earlier today in its 2011 Annual Report that the Competition Bureau has granted it conditional immunity in relation to the ongoing global LIBOR price-fixing investigation:
“The Canadian Competition Bureau has granted UBS conditional immunity in connection with potential competition law violations related to submissions for Yen LIBOR. As a result of these conditional grants, we will not be subject to prosecutions, fines or other sanctions for antitrust or competition law violations in the jurisdictions where we have conditional immunity or leniency in connection with the matters we reported to those authorities, subject to our continuing cooperation. However, the conditional leniency and conditional immunity grants we have received do not bar government agencies from asserting other claims against us. In addition, as a result of the conditional leniency agreement with the DOJ, we are eligible for a limit on liability to actual rather than treble damages were damages to be awarded in any civil antitrust action under US law based on conduct covered by the agreement and for relief from potential joint-and-several liability in connection with such civil antitrust action, subject to our satisfying the DOJ and the court presiding over the civil litigation of our cooperation. The conditional leniency and conditional immunity grants do not otherwise affect the ability of private parties to assert civil claims against us.”
In Canada, the Competition Bureau has established formal Immunity and Leniency programs, under which companies or individuals that may have been involved in cartel (e.g, price-fixing) or other criminal conduct under the Competition Act may, if all conditions are satisfied, receive full immunity from prosecution or reductions in fines for cooperating with a Bureau investigation.
On February 17, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Construction G.T.R.L. (1990) Inc., Acoustique JCG Inc. and Enterprises de Construction OPC Inc. pleaded guilty to bid-rigging in Quebec Superior Court in a case relating to the expansion of the Chicoutimi Hospital in 2003 (see: Quebec Construction Companies Plead Guilty to Rigging Bids for the Chicoutimi Hospital).
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“The court ordered Construction G.T.R.L. to pay a fine of $50,000, and Acoustique JCG and Entreprises de Construction OPC to pay a fine of $25,000 each. The companies are subject to a court order for a period of 10 years.
‘Bid-rigging harms everyone but the criminals who cheat the system for their own financial gain,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘In this case, the bid-rigging scheme ultimately harmed the Chicoutimi Hospital and Saguenay residents, by preventing the hospital from obtaining a competitive price for its renovation.’”
The construction industry has long been a target of competition/antitrust regulators. For example, some of the construction related cases in Canada, many of which have also involved trade associations and have gone back about a century, have included building contractors, corrugated metal pipe manufacturers, electrical contractors, gypsum dealers and manufacturers, plumbing contractors, road surfacing contractors, chain link fence contractors, among many others.
There have also been a number of recent bid-rigging cases in Canada involving construction and construction supply related companies.
See for example: Guilty Plea and $425,000 Fine for Bid-rigging in Montreal, Charges Laid in Residential Construction Bid-rigging Scheme in Montreal, Competition Bureau Exposes Sewer Services Cartel in Quebec, Competition Bureau Obtains Court Order Against the Saskatchewan Roofing Contractors Association.
This is the fourth in a series of posts on Canadian bid-rigging law, which will conclude with practical steps for companies to take to reduce potential risk in light of historical risk and current heightened enforcement.
On January 6, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced its first conspiracy (i.e., cartel) case under Canada’s amended Competition Act, partially brought under the amended section 45 of the Competition Act.
In this case, two companies pleaded guilty of fixing the price of polyurethane foam and were fined a total of C $12.5 million (see: Cartels Update: Bureau Announces $12.5 Million Fine in First Price-fixing Case Under Amended Competition Act and Competition Bureau Sends Signal to Price-Fixers with $12.5 Million Fine).
In making the announcement, believed to be one of a number of new cartel cases currently being investigated, the Bureau highlighted its stepped-up enforcement of cartels described as “reinvigorated”:
“’Yesterday’s guilty plea is the first conviction under Canada’s amended conspiracy law,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘This investigation highlights the Bureau’s reinvigorated mandate to stop consumer harm caused by price-fixing, and to secure significant fines for these serious criminal offences.’
In other recent remarks, the Bureau has similarly indicated that it intends to enhance its investigation of cartels under Canada’s new conspiracy (cartel) rules:
“In our Criminal work, we continue to concentrate on the, admittedly, lengthy process of ‘changing the game’— reorienting our approach at the Bureau, our processes, and our mindset to a more appropriately aggressive stance to respond, as we must, to our new more powerful criminal provisions.
As we move forward with our new criminal regime, consistency, consistency, and consistency is our focus. There will be no arbitrary relaxing of standards under the Bureau’s watch — a practice that can only impair predictability and fairness in enforcement. Further, we will use our investigative tools such as searches, wiretaps and section 11 orders.
Cartels and bid–rigging continue to be our focus, given the seriousness of this conduct, and its unambiguously harmful nature. We are committed to advancing cases that matter to Canadians, doing so in a timely manner, and following them through to the end.”
(See: Commissioner of Competition, Keynote Speech at the Canadian Bar Association 2011 Fall Conference).
Based on these and other recent developments, we will be posting overviews of Canadian conspiracy and bid-rigging laws, each concluding with practical steps companies can take to reduce potential criminal liability (and overviews of the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, which are increasingly key to Bureau investigations and parties implicated in criminal conduct to reduce liability).
On January 6, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced its first cartel case under Canada’s amended Competition Act, partially brought under the new section 45 of the Competition Act.
In this case, two companies pleaded guilty of fixing the price of polyurethane foam and were fined a total of C $12.5 million (see: Cartels Update: Bureau Announces $12.5 Million Fine in First Price-fixing Case Under Amended Competition Act and Competition Bureau Sends Signal to Price-Fixers with $12.5 Million Fine).
In making the announcement, believed to be one of a number of new cartel cases currently being investigated, the Bureau highlighted its stepped-up enforcement of cartels:
“’Yesterday’s guilty plea is the first conviction under Canada’s amended conspiracy law,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘This investigation highlights the Bureau’s reinvigorated mandate to stop consumer harm caused by price-fixing, and to secure significant fines for these serious criminal offences.’
In other recent public remarks, the Bureau has similarly indicated that it intends to enhance its investigation of cartels under Canada’s new conspiracy (cartel) rules:
“In our Criminal work, we continue to concentrate on the, admittedly, lengthy process of ‘changing the game’— reorienting our approach at the Bureau, our processes, and our mindset to a more appropriately aggressive stance to respond, as we must, to our new more powerful criminal provisions.
As we move forward with our new criminal regime, consistency, consistency, and consistency is our focus. There will be no arbitrary relaxing of standards under the Bureau’s watch — a practice that can only impair predictability and fairness in enforcement. Further, we will use our investigative tools such as searches, wiretaps and section 11 orders.
Cartels and bid–rigging continue to be our focus, given the seriousness of this conduct, and its unambiguously harmful nature. We are committed to advancing cases that matter to Canadians, doing so in a timely manner, and following them through to the end.”
(See: Commissioner of Competition, Keynote Speech at the Canadian Bar Association 2011 Fall Conference).
Based on these and other recent developments, we will be posting overviews of Canadian conspiracy and bid-rigging laws, each concluding with practical steps companies can take to reduce potential criminal liability (and overviews of the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, which are increasingly proving to be key for both Bureau investigations and parties to reduce liability).
For Part 1 see: here.
We read this rather fine article by Ted Banks recently on corporate antitrust compliance in Competition Policy International and reprint it here with permission. CPI is currently featuring a series of articles on corporate compliance.
By Theodore L. Banks
Ted Banks is counsel to the law firm of Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Scharf: www.schoeman.com and President of Compliance & Competition Consultants, LLC: www.complianceconsultants.com). First published in Competition Policy International (CPI) Antitrust Chronicle (February 2012(1)).
Antitrust Compliance – It’s All About the Culture
INTRODUCTION
What does it take to develop an antitrust compliance program that works? There are a lot of pieces. The employees must be presented with materials that are directly relevant to each of their jobs. It must be done in a way that is easily understandable. It must be ubiquitous, so that little or no effort is needed to gain access to information. There should also be business controls so that violations are not easy to accomplish—or difficult to detect.
We’ve known these things for a long time. In antitrust, which in many ways is the grandfather (or perhaps the godfather) of corporate compliance programs, we’ve had detailed policies, handbooks, training courses, videos, slides. No shortage of information—yet the violations continue. The Justice Department seems to have given up on compliance when it comes to antitrust. Their main method to control cartel behavior is not to encourage prevention (i.e., compliance), but to encourage confession (i.e., the amnesty program). In fact, they are apparently so disgusted with the sorry state of compliance[1] that they got a carve-out from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when it comes to antitrust. If convicted of a violation of any other federal criminal law, the company can get credit for good intentions if its compliance program met the definition of an “effective” program. But not true for antitrust.
It is not as if antitrust is the only area where compliance programs do not seem to be making continuous improvement. The recently released 2011 National Business Ethics Survey from the Ethics Resource Center is not very encouraging. It showed an increase in companies that employees thought had a “weak ethics culture” and where employees felt pressured to ignore the company’s own ethical policies or break the law. Employees perceive there is more retaliation against employees that report wrongdoing, and more employees thought their managers were unethical. And what do they think of senior management? More perception of self-interest without being guided by ethics.
Interestingly, the failures that were identified were not ones of lack of knowledge, but were failures of culture.
Templates/precedents and checklists to run promotional contests in Canada
Templates/precedents and checklists to comply with Canadian anti-spam law (CASL)
