Archive for the 'Gasoline' Category
March 22, 2013
Earlier today, the Competition Bureau announced that three individuals have been found guilty for their roles in the ongoing Quebec gas price-fixing case (see: Quebec Gas Price-fixers Found Guilty).
January 10, 2013
The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) has published an interesting new working paper on cartels in the energy industry entitled Collusive Agreements in the Energy Industry: Insights into U.S. Antitrust Enforcement. Abstract:
“This working paper examines collusive agreements in the U.S. energy industry, with a focus on Section 1 energy cases brought by the U.S. government since the early 1990s. It observes that public Section 1 enforcement in various segments of the domestic energy sector appears not to follow the pattern of enforcement against anticompetitive agreements more generally. Anomalies are apparent in terms of the relative number of cases won, a preponderance of civil (versus criminal) enforcement actions, and liberal use of injunctions. The paper proceeds to examine possible explanations for these observations, including the roles of regulation and judicially- created antitrust immunities in restraining a more vigorous approach to public enforcement. It concludes with observations and policy recommendations.”
Some of the key conclusions in this paper include relatively few energy cases being enforced under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (compared to more aggressive enforcement in relation to mergers), price-fixing in the gasoline sector likely being subject to criminal prosecution (while other types of coordination, such as output restraints, tend to more likely face civil enforcement), U.S. enforcement agencies predominantly pursue enforcement in the energy sector civilly generally and through injunctions rather than monetary penalties and antitrust immunities have not played a strong role in enforcement. These conclusions, if accurate, are in contrast to Canada in some key respects, including the fact that the Competition Bureau continues to pursue criminal enforcement in the downstream oil and gas sector and routinely seeks criminal fines and penalties, including against individuals.
November 24, 2012
Competition/antitrust law penalties in Canada, of course, do not compare to the magnitude of those in the EU or U.S. (where fines can reach hundreds of millions of dollars or Euros).
Having said that, given that 2012 is drawing to a close, I was curious what the fines in Canada have been over the past year. In this regard, though not exhaustive, the following is a brief tiptoe through the cartel, bid-rigging and misleading advertising fine landscape in the last year in Canada:
$12.5 million – Two companies sentenced in relation to a price-fixing cartel for polyurethane foam (January, 2012) (see: here).
$9 million – Five companies and three individuals held to have violated the misleading advertising provisions of the Competition Act (March 2, 2012) (see: here).
$5.5 million – An airline sentenced in relation to an international air cargo price-fixing cartel (July 19, 2012) (see: here).
$2 million – Three companies sentenced in relation to a gas price-fixing conspiracy in Kingston and Brockville, Ontario (March, 2012) (see: here).
$1.5 million – A company sentenced in relation to a price-fixing conspiracy in the aftermarket automotive lights market; part of the ongoing global auto parts cartel investigation (May, 2012) (see: here).
$500,000 – A company sentenced in relation to a gas price-fixing conspiracy in Belleville, Ontario (April 13, 2012) (see: here).
$125,000 – A company sentenced in relation to a bid-rigging cartel for federal government contracts (July 30, 2012) (see: here).
On September 28, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Irving Oil and its Quebec manager have been charged (three charges against each of the corporation and manager) for allegedly fixing gasoline prices in certain local Quebec markets in the Bureau’s ongoing Quebec gas price-fixing investigation. In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“’These charges highlight our continued and steadfast commitment to combating domestic price-fixing cartels,’ said John Pecman, Interim Commissioner of Competition. ‘Canadians are ultimately on the losing end of secret agreements that cheat them out of their money.’
By using a number of investigative tools, including wiretaps and searches, the Bureau found evidence that in certain local Quebec markets gas retailers, or their representatives, communicated with one another to agree on the price they would charge customers for gasoline.
Thirty-nine individuals and 15 companies have now been charged with criminal price-fixing in this case. To date, 27 individuals and seven companies have pleaded guilty with fines totalling over $3 million. Of the 27 individuals who have pleaded guilty, six have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment totaling 54 months.”
Under Canadian competition law, the federal Competition Act makes the following three categories of agreements between competitors (or potential competitors) per se illegal:
1. Price-fixing agreements. Agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product.
2. Market allocation/division agreements. Agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product.
3. Output/supply restriction agreements. Agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product (which is broad enough to potentially include group boycotts).
According to Reuters reporting earlier today, Irving said it was not aware of the alleged price-fixing activities involving its personnel and took steps to stop the conduct:
“Our company was not aware of these activities and, when our company became aware of them, we took immediate steps to address the situation, including disciplinary action,” spokeswoman Carolyn Van der Veen said in an email. “Our company believes that we should not be held responsible for the actions of employees who knowingly violated company policy.”
The potential risk for individuals involved in criminal price-fixing and other activities under the Competition Act has also increased, given several key recent developments that include the elimination of conditional sentences (i.e., sentences served in the community) for price-fixing offences under the Act, an increased appetite by the Bureau to seek penalties against individuals and a recent decision by the Federal Court indicating that that Court will not necessarily automatically accept sentencing submissions carving out individuals in the context of pleas.
For a copy of the Bureau’s news release and backgrounder see: Irving Oil Charged in Gas Price-Fixing Cartel and Bureau Activities.
____________________
For more information about our regulatory law services: Contact
For more regulatory law updates follow us on Twitter: @CanadaAttorney
On April 13, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Suncor Energy Products Inc. (Sunoco) pleaded guilty to fixing gasoline prices from May to November, 2007 in Belleville, Ontario and that the Ontario Superior Court sentenced it to pay a $500,000 fine (see: Suncor (Sunoco) Energy Pleads Guilty to Price-Fixing in Belleville, Ontario).
In making the announcement, the Commissioner of Competition said:
“We are committed to pursuing those who engage in anti-competitive behaviour that harms Canadian businesses and consumers … Illegal agreements between competitors to fix prices deny consumers the benefits of competitive prices and choice.”
Last month, Pioneer Energy LP, Canadian Tire Corporation and Mr. Gas also pleaded guilty to price-fixing during the same period (in Kingston and Brockville) and were fined $2 million (see: Competition Bureau Announces $2 Million in Ontario Gas Price-fixing Case).
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be proven): (i) price-fixing agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product or service), (ii) market allocation/division agreements (agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product), (iii) output/supply restriction agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product).
Other types of agreements between competitors are potentially subject to review under a second and separate non-criminal reviewable matters agreement provision (section 90.1).
According to the Bureau, it became aware of the price-fixing activities in this case using its Immunity and Leniency Programs (see: Backgrounder – Gasoline Companies Plead Guilty to Price-Fixing in Kingston and Brockville, Ontario). Under the Competition Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, applicants may receive full immunity from prosecution or reductions in penalties for cooperating with a Bureau investigation.
Under the Bureau’s Immunity Program, a party or company implicated in criminal conduct under the Act may offer to cooperate with the Bureau in its investigation and request immunity (i.e., full immunity from prosecution for criminal offences under the Act). Under the Bureau’s Leniency Program, parties that have contravened criminal provisions of the Act that are not entitled to full immunity (e.g., are not “first in”) may nevertheless be eligible for leniency in sentencing. Importantly, the Bureau’s Immunity Program is a “race” in that only the first eligible applicant is entitled to full immunity. As such, evaluating whether the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs are available is an important and time-sensitive step for parties to potentially reduce liability.
According to the Bureau, it also used wiretaps and search warrants in its investigation in this case, searching five corporate locations, nine residences and two residential offices, seizing thousands of paper and electronic records and interviewing witnesses (for more about the Bureau’s enforcement powers see: Bureau Enforcement).
On April 13, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that it had obtained six more guilty pleas in connection with its ongoing Quebec gasoline price-fixing investigation (five individuals and one company), with additional fines of $155,000. According to the Bureau, 27 individuals and 7 companies have pleaded guilty to date in this case with total fines of over $3 million.
This investigation is the largest criminal investigation in the Bureau’s history and has been active for about four years (charges were first laid in June 2008).
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be proven): (i) price-fixing agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product or service), (ii) market allocation/division agreements (agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product), (iii) output/supply restriction agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product).
Other types of agreements between competitors are potentially subject to review under a second and separate non-criminal reviewable matters agreement provision (section 90.1).
The Competition Bureau also has formal Immunity and Leniency Programs under which applicants may receive full immunity from prosecution (or reductions in penalties) for cooperating with an investigation, and which the Bureau increasingly relies on to detect cartels.
Under the Bureau’s Immunity Program, a party or company implicated in criminal conduct under the Act may offer to cooperate with the Bureau in its investigation and request immunity (i.e., full immunity from prosecution for criminal offences under the Act). Under the Bureau’s Leniency Program, parties that have contravened criminal provisions of the Act that are not entitled to full immunity (e.g., are not “first in”) may nevertheless be eligible for leniency in sentencing. Importantly, the Bureau’s Immunity Program is a “race” in that only the first eligible applicant is entitled to full immunity. As such, evaluating whether the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs are available is an important and time-sensitive step for parties to potentially reduce liability.
In a curious story that caught my eye today, CTV reported that the City of Ottawa is threatening to terminate its contracts with companies found to have conspired to fix the price of gas in Ottawa and ban all future City purchases from them.
According to CTV, City of Ottawa Councilors Stephen Blais and Steve Desroches sent a letter to Canadian Tire, Mr. Gas and Pioneer in Ottawa, all of which pleaded guilty in Ontario Superior Court last week to fixing the price of gas in 2007 and were fined $2 million (see: Competition Bureau Announces $2 Million Fines in Ontario Gas Price-fixing Case).
This case is the second major gasoline price-fixing investigation that the Bureau has disclosed in the past several years (the Bureau is currently concluding the largest criminal investigation in its history in relation to gasoline price-fixing in Quebec – see: Further Individual Pleads Guilty in Quebec Gasoline Price-fixing Cartel).
On March 20, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced that Canadian Tire Corporation, Pioneer Energy LP and Mr. Gas pleaded guilty in Ontario Superior Court in Brockville, Ontario to fixing the price of gasoline in 2007 at the pump and were fined $2 million.
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“’Consumers in Kingston and Brockville were denied a competitive price for gasoline as a result of this criminal price-fixing cartel,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘The Bureau will not hesitate to take action when it uncovers evidence of illegal price-fixing.’
The pleas are as follows: Pioneer Energy LP pleaded guilty to price-fixing in Kingston and Brockville, and was fined $985,000; Canadian Tire Corporation pleaded guilty to price-fixing in Kingston and Brockville, and was fined $900,000; and Mr. Gas pleaded guilty to price-fixing in Brockville and was fined $150,000.
Today’s criminal charges and guilty pleas are the result of an extensive Bureau investigation that found evidence that gas retailers or their representatives in these local markets phoned each other and agreed on the price they would charge customers for gasoline. The Bureau’s investigation into potential price-fixing in the retail gasoline market continues in the Southeastern Ontario market.”
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be shown):
1. Price-fixing agreements. Agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product.
2. Market allocation/division agreements. Agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product.
3. Output/supply restriction agreements. Agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product (which may include group boycotts).
Templates/precedents and checklists to run promotional contests in Canada
Templates/precedents and checklists to comply with Canadian anti-spam law (CASL)
