Archive for the 'Conspiracy' Category
On October 25, 2011, the Competition Bureau published the Commissioner of Competition’s speech given at the 2011 Canadian Bar Association’s Annual Competition Law Conference in Ottawa.
It is fair to say that the Commissioner’s recent speech presented a singular tone across the civil and criminal competition law areas: enhanced enforcement.
Of the Commissioner’s remarks, some of the more interesting points include the Bureau’s increased focus on reviewing non-notifiable mergers (i.e., transactions that do not trigger the notification thresholds under the Competition Act), the statement that the Bureau has begun to revoke markers in some immunity cases where in its view immunity applicants are not complying with its Immunity Program and a subtle suggestion that the Bureau was preparing to bring, but not quite yet in a position to commence, the first conspiracy cases under the amended section 45 (Canada’s new hard core criminal conspiracy offences). The following are some highlights from the Commissioner’s recent speech.
October 4, 2011
We are pleased to announce the forthcoming publication by Carswell this fall of The Competition Law Guide for Associations in Canada jointly authored by Steve Szentesi and Mark Katz.
On July 19th, the Competition Bureau announced that a Montreal company, Les Entreprises Promécanic Ltée, has pleaded guilty to three charges of bid-rigging and was fined $425,000 for its alleged role in rigging bids in relation to residential highrise building ventilation contracts in Montreal.
According to the Bureau, the Montreal company admitted that it was involved in coordinating with competitors to pre-determine the outcome of bids. Interestingly, this case also included an internal compensation arrangement between the parties to ensure that contracts were awarded to the pre-arranged company.
In making the announcement, the Commissioner Melanie Aitken said:
“Bid-rigging deprives Canadians of the benefits of a competitive market, including lower prices and product choice. … The Competition Bureau will continue to vigorously seek prosecution against those who thwart the forces of competition.”
The Bureau also reiterated that criminal cartels and bid-rigging remain enforcement priorities, stating that “attacking cartels, including bid-rigging offences, is one of the Bureau’s top priorities.”
In Canada, bid-rigging is a criminal offence under section 47 of the federal Competition Act, under which it is an offence to enter into an agreement, in response to a call or request for bids or tenders, to not submit a bid or tender, withdraw a bid or tender already made or submit bids or tenders that are arrived at by agreement.
Like criminal conspiracy agreements under section 45 of the Act, bid-rigging is a per se criminal offence, in that it is not necessary to establish any adverse market effects (though all elements of the offence must be proven on the criminal burden of proof – i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt).
Parties violating the bid-rigging provisions of the Act are liable to unlimited fines (i.e., a fine in the discretion of the court), imprisonment for up to 14 years, or both. It is also common for the Bureau to seek prohibition orders in bid-rigging cases, as the Bureau also did in this case, to prohibit the continuation of an offence.
Private parties that have suffered loss or damage as a result of a breach of the criminal provisions of the Act, including the bid-rigging offences under section 47, may also commence private civil actions.
For the complete Bureau news release see:
Guilty Plea and $425,000 Fine for Bid-rigging in Montreal
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On June 27th, the Competition Bureau announced that would seek to block a proposed joint venture between Air Canada and United Continental which, according to the Bureau, would “monopolize ten important Canada/United States routes, and substantially reduce competition on nine additional routes.”
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“The proposed joint venture is effectively a merger between Air Canada and United Continental on all of their Canadian and US operations. It would allow the parties to jointly set prices, capacity and schedules. If allowed to proceed, it will result in:
a monopoly on ten transborder routes;
substantially reduced competition on an additional nine transborder routes; and
significantly higher prices.
In addition to challenging the joint venture, the Commissioner is challenging three existing “coordination agreements” between Air Canada and United Continental. These agreements allow Air Canada and United Continental to coordinate key aspects of competition including, but not limited to, joint pricing and scheduling, as well as revenue sharing. Through these existing agreements, the companies currently have the power to charge passengers inflated fares. Moreover, if these anti-competitive provisions are further implemented, with or without the joint venture, Canadians will pay even more for less choice and higher fares.”
The Bureau has now filed its application in this case (see: Competition Tribunal).
The Bureau’s application, which is only the second contested merger since 2005, has a number of interesting aspects. These include:
Parties’ press releases. The Bureau became aware of the proposed Air Canada/United JV from press releases issued by the parties. In the past, it was thought rather uncommon for the Bureau to become aware of mergers through the media (i.e., as opposed to parties notifying transactions to the Bureau under the pre-merger notification provisions of the Act). This may signal an increasing effort by the Bureau to challenge mergers discovered through media sweeps, either on the basis that they were notifiable or non-notifiable transactions that nevertheless potentially raise substantive competition issues (the Bureau has jurisdiction under the Act to challenge any “merger” as broadly defined in the Act, whether or not it is notifiable, i.e., exceeds the Act’s pre-notification thresholds).
Joint venture challenged as a merger. This case is also interesting as a challenge of a JV as a merger. While joint ventures can in theory be reviewed under four provisions of the Act (as a criminal conspiracy, under the civil agreements provision, as a merger or under the abuse of dominance provisions), challenges of JVs in Canada on merger grounds are relatively rare. Having said that, the definition of “merger” under the Act is very broad, encompassing not only conventional asset and share acquisitions, but also the acquisition of a “significant interest” in a business. While the Bureau has taken the position in its Merger Enforcement Guidelines (MEGs) that acquiring a “significant interest” could include where an acquirer obtained an “ability to materially influence the economic behavior of the business” (such as through control of pricing, purchasing, distribution and marketing decisions), what JVs might in reality be considered a merger has generally been more the subject of speculation than certainty for merging parties and their counsel. In this regard, the Bureau takes the position in its recently filed Application that the proposed merger will, if allowed to proceed, lead to the parties “acquiring or establishing … a significant interest” in each other’s operations, and in particular the ability to make decisions on “all aspects of competitive behavior” that would be “indistinguishable … from common ownership.” As such, if this application proceeds, it may shed needed light on what types of de facto acquisitions may trigger the merger provisions of the Act.
First challenge under section 90.1 (civil agreements provision). The case is also the first challenge by the Bureau under the civil agreements provision (section 90.1) of the Act, which came into force in March, 2010 as part of Canada’s new two-track conspiracy regime. Under section 90.1, the Bureau may make applications to the Competition Tribunal for Tribunal orders where an agreement between actual or potential competitors prevents or lessens competition substantially in one or more markets (or is likely to do so). While it is generally thought that this new civil provision has many parallels to the existing merger provisions of the Act, including the required competitive effects test, evaluative factors for market impacts and an efficiencies defence, this will be the first case to potentially test the meaning and boundaries of this new section. If the case proceeds before the Tribunal, it may clarify key elements of section 90.1 including the meaning of “agreement” and “competitors”, the evaluation of the required competitive effects test and how, if at all, a review under section 90.1 differs in substance from merger review under the merger provisions of the Act.
Attempt to block the transaction. Finally, the case is somewhat noteworthy in that the Bureau is seeking to block the Air Canada/United JV altogether. In Canada, unlike some other jurisdictions, it is relatively unusual for regulators to seek to block a transaction altogether, rather than to negotiate a remedy.
For the Bureau’s news release see:
Competition Bureau Seeks to Block Joint Venture between Air Canada and United Continental
For the Bureau’s Backgrounder see:
For the Bureau’s Tribunal Application see:
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The Competition Bureau announced that would seek to block a proposed joint venture between Air Canada and United Continental which, according to the Bureau, would “monopolize ten important Canada/United States routes, and substantially reduce competition on nine additional routes.”
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“The proposed joint venture is effectively a merger between Air Canada and United Continental on all of their Canadian and US operations. It would allow the parties to jointly set prices, capacity and schedules. If allowed to proceed, it will result in:
a monopoly on ten transborder routes;
substantially reduced competition on an additional nine transborder routes; and
significantly higher prices.
In addition to challenging the joint venture, the Commissioner is challenging three existing “coordination agreements” between Air Canada and United Continental. These agreements allow Air Canada and United Continental to coordinate key aspects of competition including, but not limited to, joint pricing and scheduling, as well as revenue sharing. Through these existing agreements, the companies currently have the power to charge passengers inflated fares. Moreover, if these anti-competitive provisions are further implemented, with or without the joint venture, Canadians will pay even more for less choice and higher fares.”
According to the Bureau, it became aware of the proposed Air Canada/United joint venture after the parties issued a press release.
Joint ventures can be reviewed under at least four provisions of the Competition Act: as a criminal conspiracy, under the civil agreements provision, as a merger or under the abuse of dominance provisions, which also contemplates joint dominance.
In this case, the Bureau is challenging the proposed JV under the merger provisions of the Act, which allow the federal Competition Tribunal to issue orders including blocking proposed mergers or ordering the dissolution of assets or shares in the case of a completed merger.
The Bureau is also challenging three existing “coordination agreements” between the parties under the newly enacted civil agreements provision – section 90.1 – which is the Bureau’s first challenge to an allegedly anti-competitive agreement under this provision, which came into force in 2010 as part of sweeping amendments to the Competition Act.
Under the merger provisions of the Act, the Tribunal can issue orders, including blocking proposed mergers (or ordering the dissolution of assets or shares in the case of a completed merger) where a merger is found to prevent or lessen competition substantially. Under the new civil agreements provisions – section 90.1 – the Tribunal has the power to make “remedial orders” (i.e., for conduct to stop) where an agreement between actual or potential competitors prevents or lessens competition substantially.
It is, however, relatively unusual for a proposed agreement to be independently challenged by the Bureau outside of the context of parties seeking merger clearance or an advisory opinion for proposed business conduct. Possibly the parties concluded that the proposed JV was not notifiable under the merger provisions of the Act or there was a failure to adequately review whether the proposed JV may have required merger notification.
Another interesting aspect of this case is that the Bureau alleges that the proposed joint venture was intended to circumvent foreign ownership restrictions governing Canadian airlines, by allowing the parties to in essence merge though the joint venture.
With respect to market share and concentration issues, the Bureau’s concerns appear to primarily be based on increased “post-merger” market shares on specific city pair routes of between 34% and 100% (market shares typically being calculated in airline markets based on city pair routes).
Also interesting is the fact that while the Commissioner has the power to apply to the Tribunal for remedial orders, contested merger proceedings are relatively rare in Canada with the majority of issues typically resolved by way of negotiated settlement (i.e., consent agreements for the divestiture of assets and to a lesser extent the adoption of behavioural remedies).
For example, the Bureau’s recent challenge of CCS Corporation’s proposed acquisition of Complete Environmental, owner of the proposed Babkirk Landfill in Northern British Columbia, was the Bureau’s first merger challenge since 2005.
For the complete news release see:
Competition Bureau Seeks to Block Joint Venture between Air Canada and United Continental
For the Bureau’s Backgrounder see:
For the Bureau’s Competition Tribunal Application see:
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According to the United States Department of Justice (Antitrust Division), a former executive of an Illinois refuse disposal container company has been sentenced to 16 months in prison in relation to a city of Chicago bid-rigging case (see: Former Executive of Illinois Refuse Container Repair Company Sentenced to Serve 16 Months in Prison for Conspiring to Defraud the City of Chicago).
In making the announcement, the DoJ said:
“According to the indictment, Fenzl, Ritter and their co-conspirator conspired to deceive city of Chicago officials about the number of legitimate, competitive bids submitted for the contract. Specifically, Fenzl and his co-conspirators fraudulently induced other companies to submit bids for the contract at prices determined by Fenzl and his co-conspirators and greater than the price for which Fenzl’s company had submitted a bid. The department said that included in these bids were fraudulent documents indicating that, if awarded the contract, the bidder would enter into subcontracts to purchase goods or services for a specified percentage of the contract from a minority-owned business and a women-owned business, as required by the city of Chicago. According to the indictment, Fenzl and his co-conspirators also fraudulently certified to the city on Fenzl’s company’s bid that it had not entered an agreement with any other bidder relating to the price named in any other bid submitted to the city for the contract.”
This case is interesting as an example of “cover” or “courtesy” bidding, in which some bidders submit bids that are too high to be accepted (or with terms that are unacceptable to the party calling for tenders to protect an agreed upon low bidder).
Other common forms of bid-rigging that have been prosecuted in the past, both in the U.S. and Canada, include:
Bid suppression – one or more bidders that would otherwise bid agree to refrain from bidding or agree to withdraw a previously made bid.
Bid rotation – all bidders submit bids but take turns being the low bidder according to a systematic or rotating formula.
Market division – suppliers agree not to compete in designated geographic areas or for specified customers.
Subcontracting – some bidders that agree not to submit a bid or submit a losing bid are awarded subcontracts or supply agreements from the successful low bidder.
In Canada, bid-rigging is a criminal offence under section 47 of the federal Competition Act, under which it is an offence to enter into an agreement, in response to a call or request for bids or tenders, to: (i) not submit a bid or tender, (ii) withdraw a bid or tender already made or (iii) submit bids or tenders that are arrived at by agreement.
Like criminal conspiracy agreements under section 45 of the Act, bid rigging is a per se criminal offence, in that it is not necessary to establish any adverse market effects (though all elements of the offence must be proven on the criminal burden of proof – i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt).
Parties contravening the bid-rigging provisions of the Act are liable to unlimited fines (i.e., a fine in the discretion of the court), imprisonment for up to 14 years, or both. It is also common for the Bureau to seek prohibition orders in bid-rigging cases to prohibit the continuation of an offence. Private parties that have suffered loss or damage as a result of a breach of the criminal provisions of the Act, including the bid-rigging offences under section 47 of the Act, may also commence private actions.
For more information about Canadian bid-rigging law, see: Bid-Rigging and Bid-Rigging News. For recent Canadian bid-rigging cases see: Competition Bureau Charges Eight Companies and Five Individuals in Alleged Bid-Rigging Scheme and Competition Bureau Launches Criminal Investigation into Quebec Construction Industry.
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On June 9, 2011 the European Commission announced that it had commenced an investigation into an alleged cartel in the seatbelts, airbags and steering wheels manufacturing sector with dawn raids (unannounced inspections) of manufacturers’ premises.
In making the announcement, the Commission stated:
“The European Commission can confirm that, starting on 7 June 2011, Commission officials carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of companies that supply car seatbelts, airbags and steering wheels, known in the industry as automotive occupant safety systems. The Commission has reason to believe that the companies concerned may have violated EU antitrust rules that prohibit cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
Automotive occupant safety systems cover safety products such as seatbelts, airbags and steering wheels that are supplied to car manufacturers.
The Commission officials were accompanied by their counterparts from the relevant national competition authority.
Unannounced inspections are a preliminary step into suspected anticompetitive practices. The fact that the Commission carries out such inspections does not mean that the companies are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour nor does it prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself. The Commission respects the rights of defence, in particular the right of companies to be heard in the Commission’s proceedings against them.”
The Commission has not yet identified the targets of its investigation. For the complete European Commission news release see:
Like the European Commission, the Competition Bureau has a wide range of enforcement powers available to it to investigate potential violations of competition law under the Competition Act, including the power to obtain search warrants, document production orders, orders compelling testimony under oath and wiretaps. The Bureau is increasingly resorting to these powers, particularly in relation to its enforcement priorities that include the detection and investigation of criminal cartels and deceptive and fraudulent marketing.
The Competition Act also contains obstruction provisions, which make it a criminal offence to impede or prevent (or attempt to impede or prevent) inquiries or examinations under the Act (see for example: Morgan Companies Fined $1 Million for Obstruction and Price-fixing).
As such, it is prudent for companies and organizations that may realistically face the prospect of a competition law investigation or search at some point – for example, companies engaged in higher risk industries and activities including construction, oil and gas and trade associations – are well advised to adopt basic search and seizure guidelines to reduce the likelihood of breaching Canadian competition law in the event of a search.
These commonly include guidelines dealing with how to deal with Bureau officials during a search, advising company/organization personnel, the control of information and PR, inspecting the search warrant and reducing the risk of breaching the obstruction provisions of the Act which can lead to significant additional liability (such as by breaching sealed boxes or rooms or impeding Bureau officers during a search).
For more information about the Competition Bureau’s enforcement powers see: Competition Bureau Enforcement.
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On June 10, 2011, the Competition Bureau announced that two more individuals have pleaded guilty in the ongoing Quebec gasoline price-fixing case to fix the price of gasoline at the pump in Thetford Mines, Quebec.
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“The two individuals, Claude Bédard and Stéphane Grant, former Irving employees, were sentenced to personally pay fines of $15,000 and $10,000, respectively. Messrs. Bédard and Grant were both area sales managers for ‘Les Pétroles Irving Inc.’ responsible for the Thetford Mines market.”
In this case, which was one of the largest criminal cases in the Bureau’s history, charges were laid against 38 individuals and 14 companies accused of fixing the price of gasoline at the pumps at several locations in Quebec. According to the Bureau, to date 6 companies and 13 individuals have pleaded guilty in the case.
The case is also somewhat noteworthy in that six individuals have been sentenced to total imprisonment of 54 months (served in the community). While the penalties for contravening the criminal conspiracy provisions of the Competition Act include imprisonment for up to fourteen years, prison sentences for individuals have been, at least to date, relatively rare in Canada with liability in many cases being negotiated down to corporate liability and fines.
For the Bureau’s news release see:
Two Individuals Plead Guilty in Quebec Gasoline Price-Fixing Cartel
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Templates/precedents and checklists to run promotional contests in Canada
Templates/precedents and checklists to comply with Canadian anti-spam law (CASL)
