Archive for the 'Associations' Category
On February 17, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Construction G.T.R.L. (1990) Inc., Acoustique JCG Inc. and Enterprises de Construction OPC Inc. pleaded guilty to bid-rigging in Quebec Superior Court in a case relating to the expansion of the Chicoutimi Hospital in 2003 (see: Quebec Construction Companies Plead Guilty to Rigging Bids for the Chicoutimi Hospital).
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“The court ordered Construction G.T.R.L. to pay a fine of $50,000, and Acoustique JCG and Entreprises de Construction OPC to pay a fine of $25,000 each. The companies are subject to a court order for a period of 10 years.
‘Bid-rigging harms everyone but the criminals who cheat the system for their own financial gain,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘In this case, the bid-rigging scheme ultimately harmed the Chicoutimi Hospital and Saguenay residents, by preventing the hospital from obtaining a competitive price for its renovation.’”
The construction industry has long been a target of competition/antitrust regulators. For example, some of the construction related cases in Canada, many of which have also involved trade associations and have gone back about a century, have included building contractors, corrugated metal pipe manufacturers, electrical contractors, gypsum dealers and manufacturers, plumbing contractors, road surfacing contractors, chain link fence contractors, among many others.
There have also been a number of recent bid-rigging cases in Canada involving construction and construction supply related companies.
See for example: Guilty Plea and $425,000 Fine for Bid-rigging in Montreal, Charges Laid in Residential Construction Bid-rigging Scheme in Montreal, Competition Bureau Exposes Sewer Services Cartel in Quebec, Competition Bureau Obtains Court Order Against the Saskatchewan Roofing Contractors Association.
This is the fourth in a series of posts on Canadian bid-rigging law, which will conclude with practical steps for companies to take to reduce potential risk in light of historical risk and current heightened enforcement.
On January 6, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced its first conspiracy (i.e., cartel) case under Canada’s amended Competition Act, partially brought under the amended section 45 of the Competition Act.
In this case, two companies pleaded guilty of fixing the price of polyurethane foam and were fined a total of C $12.5 million (see: Cartels Update: Bureau Announces $12.5 Million Fine in First Price-fixing Case Under Amended Competition Act and Competition Bureau Sends Signal to Price-Fixers with $12.5 Million Fine).
In making the announcement, believed to be one of a number of new cartel cases currently being investigated, the Bureau highlighted its stepped-up enforcement of cartels described as “reinvigorated”:
“’Yesterday’s guilty plea is the first conviction under Canada’s amended conspiracy law,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘This investigation highlights the Bureau’s reinvigorated mandate to stop consumer harm caused by price-fixing, and to secure significant fines for these serious criminal offences.’
In other recent remarks, the Bureau has similarly indicated that it intends to enhance its investigation of cartels under Canada’s new conspiracy (cartel) rules:
“In our Criminal work, we continue to concentrate on the, admittedly, lengthy process of ‘changing the game’— reorienting our approach at the Bureau, our processes, and our mindset to a more appropriately aggressive stance to respond, as we must, to our new more powerful criminal provisions.
As we move forward with our new criminal regime, consistency, consistency, and consistency is our focus. There will be no arbitrary relaxing of standards under the Bureau’s watch — a practice that can only impair predictability and fairness in enforcement. Further, we will use our investigative tools such as searches, wiretaps and section 11 orders.
Cartels and bid–rigging continue to be our focus, given the seriousness of this conduct, and its unambiguously harmful nature. We are committed to advancing cases that matter to Canadians, doing so in a timely manner, and following them through to the end.”
(See: Commissioner of Competition, Keynote Speech at the Canadian Bar Association 2011 Fall Conference).
Based on these and other recent developments, we will be posting overviews of Canadian conspiracy and bid-rigging laws, each concluding with practical steps companies can take to reduce potential criminal liability (and overviews of the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, which are increasingly key to Bureau investigations and parties implicated in criminal conduct to reduce liability).
On February 17, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Construction G.T.R.L. (1990) Inc., Acoustique JCG Inc. and Enterprises de Construction OPC Inc. pleaded guilty to bid-rigging in Quebec Superior Court in a case relating to the expansion of the Chicoutimi Hospital in 2003 (see: Quebec Construction Companies Plead Guilty to Rigging Bids for the Chicoutimi Hospital).
In making the announcement, the Bureau said:
“The court ordered Construction G.T.R.L. to pay a fine of $50,000, and Acoustique JCG and Entreprises de Construction OPC to pay a fine of $25,000 each. The companies are subject to a court order for a period of 10 years.
‘Bid-rigging harms everyone but the criminals who cheat the system for their own financial gain,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘In this case, the bid-rigging scheme ultimately harmed the Chicoutimi Hospital and Saguenay residents, by preventing the hospital from obtaining a competitive price for its renovation.’”
The construction industry has long been a target of competition/antitrust regulators. For example, some of the construction related cases in Canada, many of which have also involved trade associations and have gone back about a century, have included building contractors, corrugated metal pipe manufacturers, electrical contractors, gypsum dealers and manufacturers, plumbing contractors, road surfacing contractors, chain link fence contractors, among many others.
There have also been a number of recent bid-rigging cases in Canada involving construction and construction supply related companies.
See for example: Guilty Plea and $425,000 Fine for Bid-rigging in Montreal, Charges Laid in Residential Construction Bid-rigging Scheme in Montreal, Competition Bureau Exposes Sewer Services Cartel in Quebec, Competition Bureau Obtains Court Order Against the Saskatchewan Roofing Contractors Association.
This is the third in a series of posts on Canadian bid-rigging law, which will conclude with practical steps for companies to take to reduce potential risk in light of historical risk and current heightened enforcement.
For Parts 1 and 2 see: here and here.
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The British Columbia Real Estate Association has published its 2012 Legal Update book for members of British Columbia real estate boards and BCREA.
This 2012 installment of its annual legal update series includes the following chapters:
Does One Have to be a Lie Detector in Real Estate (Greg Blanchard), Material Latent Defect or Stigmatization (Brian Taylor), Condition or Covenant (Peter Ramsay), Damages for Failure to Complete (Devin Kanhai), Licensee Remuneration – Entitlement (Devin Kanhai), The Homeowner Protection Act – What Needs to be Considered (Doug Cox and Jan Calkins), REDMA Update (Jennifer Clee), Electronic Transactions Act (Ed Wilson) and Canadian Competition Law – The New Competition Act – The First 2 Years in Force (Steve Szentesi).
The competition law update chapter in this new publication, prepared by our firm, includes discussions of: (i) the 2009 and 2010 amendments to the Competition Act, (ii) Competition Act enforcement and penalties, (iii) key enforcement developments in the past two years (including conspiracy and misleading advertising law developments), (iv) a discussion of key implications of Canada’s new competition laws for Canadian real estate agents and brokers, (v) a discussion of the CREA abuse of dominance case (settled at the end of 2010) and mere postings and (vi) and a brief overview of Canada’s new anti-spam legislation (Bill C-28).
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For more information about our regulatory law services contact: contact
For more regulatory law updates follow us on Twitter: @CanadaAttorney
William E. Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert C. Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie M. Marx (Duke University) and Halbert L. White (University of California) have published a new article on plus factors and agreement in antitrust law (see: “Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law”).
Summary of article (abstract):
“Despite the crucial role of concerted action to collusion among rival firms, few elements are more perplexing than the design of evidentiary standards to determine whether parallel conduct stems from collective or from unilateral decision making. Courts allow a collusive agreement to be established by circumstantial evidence, but the evidence must show additional evidence — “plus factors” — beyond parallel movement in price. Chief plus factors identified by courts have included actions contrary to each defendant’s self-interest unless pursued as part of a collective plan, phenomena that can be explained rationally only as a result of concerted action, evidence that defendants created the opportunity for regulation communication, industry performance data that suggests successful coordination, and the absence of a plausible legitimate business rational for suspicious conduct.
The frailties of the existing analytical tests for assessing plus factors impede the economically sensible resolution of many high-stakes antitrust cases where decisions made on the issue of conspiracy are decisive and such inadequacies may be magnified in the future. No cases have offered useful operational means for determining when the defendants have engaged in something more than consciously parallel conduct. It is possible to improve on existing approaches by focusing more precisely on the forms of behavior that firms use to communicate their intentions and to execute the tasks needed to achieve coordination on pricing, output, and other dimensions of effective collusion. Case law addressing plus factors has not established a methodology for ranking plus factors according to their probative value. The authors believe that the actions of an explicit cartel, and the outcomes of those actions, should illuminate the path to identifying plus factors and that any of those actions that surely do not result from unilateral conduct should be given special attention. Further, courts and enforcement agencies cannot address the agreement in question without awareness of remedial issues that stand in the background. Courts are left with a conundrum because they cannot meaningfully instruct firms not to react to their rivals’ pricing. When firms in an industry are players in a repeated game with substantially incomplete and asymmetric information, courts can examine buyer actions to attempt to distinguish between conduct that is an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act and conduct that is not.
This Article offers a way to increase understanding of plus factors and to improve the manner in which enforcement agencies and courts interpret them in individual cases by advocating the use of basic probability theory to rank plus factors in terms of their probative value. It proposes a formal definition of plus factors, a taxonomy of plus factors, and a coherent methodology for ranking them in terms of their probative values. It also proposes that plus factors should be considered in constellations whenever such groups are present because the probative value of the group can be far greater than the individual plus factors in the group.”
Circumstantial evidence and plus factors under Canadian law
Under the Canadian Competition Act, a court may infer the existence of a conspiracy, agreement or arrangement under the conspiracy offences of the Act (section 45) based on circumstantial evidence, with or without direct evidence of communication between or among the alleged parties (though a conspiracy agreement must still be proven on the criminal burden of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt). Some common examples of “plus factors”, sometimes also referred to as “facilitating factors”, that can be used to prove an unlawful conspiracy agreement, include evidence of meetings, simultaneous price increases or other simultaneous actions, statements inferring the existence of an agreement, enforcement or monitoring and conduct that can only be explained by the existence of an agreement.
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For more information about our regulatory law services contact: contact
For more regulatory law updates follow us on Twitter: @CanadaAttorney
On February 23rd, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DoJ”) announced that two financial investors that purchased municipal tax liens at auction in New Jersey pleaded guilty to conspiring to rig bids for the sale of tax liens auctioned by municipalities in New Jersey.
In making the announcement, the DoJ said:
“Two financial investors who purchased municipal tax liens at auctions in New Jersey pleaded guilty today for conspiring to rig bids for the sale of tax liens auctioned by municipalities throughout the state, the Department of Justice announced.
A felony charge was filed today in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in Newark, N.J., against Robert W. Stein of Huntington Valley, Pa., and David M. Farber of Cherry Hill, N.J. Under the plea agreements, which are subject to court approval, Stein and Farber have both agreed to cooperate with the department’s ongoing investigation.
According to the felony charge against Stein, from as early as 1998 until approximately spring 2009, Stein participated in a conspiracy to rig bids at auctions for the sale of municipal tax liens in New Jersey by agreeing to allocate among certain bidders on which liens to bid. According to the felony charge against Farber, from as early as the beginning of 2005 through approximately February 2009, Farber also participated in a conspiracy to rig bids at auctions for the sale of municipal tax liens in New Jersey. The department said that both Stein and Farber proceeded to submit bids in accordance with their agreements and purchased tax liens at collusive and non-competitive interest rates. “Today’s guilty pleas demonstrate that the Antitrust Division will not tolerate those who manipulate the competitive process in order to harm home and property owners,” said Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.
The department said that the primary purpose of the conspiracies was to suppress and restrain competition to obtain selected municipal tax liens offered at public auctions at non-competitive interest rates. When the owner of real property fails to pay taxes on that property, the municipality in which the property is located may attach a lien for the amount of the unpaid taxes. If the taxes remain unpaid after a waiting period, the lien may be sold at auction. State law requires that investors bid on the interest rate delinquent homeowners will pay upon redemption. By law, the bid opens at 18 percent interest and, through a competitive bidding process, can be driven down to zero percent. If a lien remains unpaid after a certain period of time, the investor who purchased the lien may begin foreclosure proceedings against the property to which the lien is attached.”
In Canada, the federal Competition Act contains standalone bid-rigging offences under section 47 of the Competition Act. This is unlike some other major jurisdictions, where bid-rigging falls under general conspiracy (i.e., cartel) prohibitions. Under section 47 of the Competition Act, it is a criminal offence for bidders or tenderers to agree to:
1. Not submit a bid or tender;
2. Withdraw a bid or tender already submitted (an offence recently added to the Competition Act following wide-ranging amendments to the Competition Act in 2009 and 2010); or
3. Submit a bid or tender arrived at by agreement.
Bid-rigging in Canada is also a “per se” criminal offence, in that, like conspiracy agreements under section 45 of the Competition Act, it is not necessary to prove any anti-competitive effects on a relevant market (or markets) to make out an offence. All elements of the offence do, however, need to be established on the standard criminal burden of proof – i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt.
On January 6, 2012 the Competition Bureau announced its first cartel case under Canada’s amended Competition Act, partially brought under the new section 45 of the Competition Act.
In this case, two companies pleaded guilty of fixing the price of polyurethane foam and were fined a total of C $12.5 million (see: Cartels Update: Bureau Announces $12.5 Million Fine in First Price-fixing Case Under Amended Competition Act and Competition Bureau Sends Signal to Price-Fixers with $12.5 Million Fine).
In making the announcement, believed to be one of a number of new cartel cases currently being investigated, the Bureau highlighted its stepped-up enforcement of cartels:
“’Yesterday’s guilty plea is the first conviction under Canada’s amended conspiracy law,’ said Melanie Aitken, Commissioner of Competition. ‘This investigation highlights the Bureau’s reinvigorated mandate to stop consumer harm caused by price-fixing, and to secure significant fines for these serious criminal offences.’
In other recent public remarks, the Bureau has similarly indicated that it intends to enhance its investigation of cartels under Canada’s new conspiracy (cartel) rules:
“In our Criminal work, we continue to concentrate on the, admittedly, lengthy process of ‘changing the game’— reorienting our approach at the Bureau, our processes, and our mindset to a more appropriately aggressive stance to respond, as we must, to our new more powerful criminal provisions.
As we move forward with our new criminal regime, consistency, consistency, and consistency is our focus. There will be no arbitrary relaxing of standards under the Bureau’s watch — a practice that can only impair predictability and fairness in enforcement. Further, we will use our investigative tools such as searches, wiretaps and section 11 orders.
Cartels and bid–rigging continue to be our focus, given the seriousness of this conduct, and its unambiguously harmful nature. We are committed to advancing cases that matter to Canadians, doing so in a timely manner, and following them through to the end.”
(See: Commissioner of Competition, Keynote Speech at the Canadian Bar Association 2011 Fall Conference).
Based on these and other recent developments, we will be posting overviews of Canadian conspiracy and bid-rigging laws, each concluding with practical steps companies can take to reduce potential criminal liability (and overviews of the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, which are increasingly proving to be key for both Bureau investigations and parties to reduce liability).
For Part 1 see: here.
We read this rather fine article by Ted Banks recently on corporate antitrust compliance in Competition Policy International and reprint it here with permission. CPI is currently featuring a series of articles on corporate compliance.
By Theodore L. Banks
Ted Banks is counsel to the law firm of Schoeman Updike Kaufman & Scharf: www.schoeman.com and President of Compliance & Competition Consultants, LLC: www.complianceconsultants.com). First published in Competition Policy International (CPI) Antitrust Chronicle (February 2012(1)).
Antitrust Compliance – It’s All About the Culture
INTRODUCTION
What does it take to develop an antitrust compliance program that works? There are a lot of pieces. The employees must be presented with materials that are directly relevant to each of their jobs. It must be done in a way that is easily understandable. It must be ubiquitous, so that little or no effort is needed to gain access to information. There should also be business controls so that violations are not easy to accomplish—or difficult to detect.
We’ve known these things for a long time. In antitrust, which in many ways is the grandfather (or perhaps the godfather) of corporate compliance programs, we’ve had detailed policies, handbooks, training courses, videos, slides. No shortage of information—yet the violations continue. The Justice Department seems to have given up on compliance when it comes to antitrust. Their main method to control cartel behavior is not to encourage prevention (i.e., compliance), but to encourage confession (i.e., the amnesty program). In fact, they are apparently so disgusted with the sorry state of compliance[1] that they got a carve-out from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when it comes to antitrust. If convicted of a violation of any other federal criminal law, the company can get credit for good intentions if its compliance program met the definition of an “effective” program. But not true for antitrust.
It is not as if antitrust is the only area where compliance programs do not seem to be making continuous improvement. The recently released 2011 National Business Ethics Survey from the Ethics Resource Center is not very encouraging. It showed an increase in companies that employees thought had a “weak ethics culture” and where employees felt pressured to ignore the company’s own ethical policies or break the law. Employees perceive there is more retaliation against employees that report wrongdoing, and more employees thought their managers were unethical. And what do they think of senior management? More perception of self-interest without being guided by ethics.
Interestingly, the failures that were identified were not ones of lack of knowledge, but were failures of culture.
Templates/precedents and checklists to run promotional contests in Canada
Templates/precedents and checklists to comply with Canadian anti-spam law (CASL)
