On April 13, 2012, the Competition Bureau announced that Suncor Energy Products Inc. (Sunoco) pleaded guilty to fixing gasoline prices from May to November, 2007 in Belleville, Ontario and that the Ontario Superior Court sentenced it to pay a $500,000 fine (see: Suncor (Sunoco) Energy Pleads Guilty to Price-Fixing in Belleville, Ontario).
In making the announcement, the Commissioner of Competition said:
“We are committed to pursuing those who engage in anti-competitive behaviour that harms Canadian businesses and consumers … Illegal agreements between competitors to fix prices deny consumers the benefits of competitive prices and choice.”
Last month, Pioneer Energy LP, Canadian Tire Corporation and Mr. Gas also pleaded guilty to price-fixing during the same period (in Kingston and Brockville) and were fined $2 million (see: Competition Bureau Announces $2 Million in Ontario Gas Price-fixing Case).
Under section 45 of the Competition Act, three types of agreements between competitors are “per se” illegal (i.e., with no adverse competitive impacts required to be proven): (i) price-fixing agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of a product or service), (ii) market allocation/division agreements (agreements to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of a product), (iii) output/supply restriction agreements (agreements to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of a product).
Other types of agreements between competitors are potentially subject to review under a second and separate non-criminal reviewable matters agreement provision (section 90.1).
According to the Bureau, it became aware of the price-fixing activities in this case using its Immunity and Leniency Programs (see: Backgrounder – Gasoline Companies Plead Guilty to Price-Fixing in Kingston and Brockville, Ontario). Under the Competition Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs, applicants may receive full immunity from prosecution or reductions in penalties for cooperating with a Bureau investigation.
Under the Bureau’s Immunity Program, a party or company implicated in criminal conduct under the Act may offer to cooperate with the Bureau in its investigation and request immunity (i.e., full immunity from prosecution for criminal offences under the Act). Under the Bureau’s Leniency Program, parties that have contravened criminal provisions of the Act that are not entitled to full immunity (e.g., are not “first in”) may nevertheless be eligible for leniency in sentencing. Importantly, the Bureau’s Immunity Program is a “race” in that only the first eligible applicant is entitled to full immunity. As such, evaluating whether the Bureau’s Immunity and Leniency Programs are available is an important and time-sensitive step for parties to potentially reduce liability.
According to the Bureau, it also used wiretaps and search warrants in its investigation in this case, searching five corporate locations, nine residences and two residential offices, seizing thousands of paper and electronic records and interviewing witnesses (for more about the Bureau’s enforcement powers see: Bureau Enforcement).
For the Bureau’s news release see:
Suncor (Sunoco) Energy Pleads Guilty to Price-Fixing in Belleville, Ontario
For more about Canada’s conspiracy laws see:
_____________________
For more information about our regulatory law services contact: contact
For more regulatory law updates follow us on Twitter: @CanadaAttorney
Templates/precedents and checklists to run promotional contests in Canada
Templates/precedents and checklists to comply with Canadian anti-spam law (CASL)
